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ABSTRACT:  This paper is concerned with the investigation of the intergenerational 
mobility of education in several European countries and its changes across birth cohorts 
(1940-1980), using a new mobility index that considers the total degree of mobility as the 
weighted sum of mobility with respect to both parents. Moreover, this mobility index 
enables the analysis of the role of family characteristics as mediating factors in the 
statistical association between individual and parental education. We find that Nordic 
countries display lower levels of educational persistence but that the degree of mobility 
increases over time only in those countries with low initial levels. Moreover, the results 
suggest that the degree of mobility with respect to fathers and mothers converges to the 
same level and that family characteristics accounts for an important part of the statistical 
association between parental education and children’s schooling; a particular finding is that 
the most important elements of family characteristics are the family’s socio-economic 
status and educational assortative mating of the parents. 
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1.Introduction  
 
The existence of some statistical association between individual outcomes and parental socio-
economic position is considered a violation of a broad principle of the equality of opportunities. 
A high level of association indicates low mobility and implies that individuals from poor social 
origins would face extremely restricted life chances and that they would have difficulty 
achieving their complete economic potential. The empirical research on intergenerational 
mobility has significantly expanded in recent decades. An important number of contributions can 
be found in the sociological literature; traditionally, sociologists are prevalently concerned about 
intergenerational association in occupation or social class1. On the contrary, the majority of the 
economic literature has usually been concerned about intergenerational persistence in earnings or 
in income (Solon 1999, 2002; Corak 2004 and Blanden 2009 provide extensive reviews about 
these topics). However, the economic literature contains a few (but growing) number of 
contributions concerned with the analysis of educational mobility from an intergenerational 
perspective. From a theoretical perspective, following Solon (2004), a strong relationship 
between individual and parental education is one of the most important mechanisms behind 
intergenerational socio-economic persistence (in income, but also in occupation, poverty or other 
outcomes).    
 
The principal issue that has been considered in this literature is the extent to which the 
intergenerational persistence in educational attainment is determined by genetic transmission. In 
fact, many authors have tried to obtain an estimate of the intergenerational elasticity of years of 
schooling, uncontaminated by “nature” or genetic effects (see Behrman and Rosenzweig 2002, 
Sacerdote 2002, or Plug 2004 within others2). Unfortunately, our data do not allow controlling 
for genetic effects; this implies that we are not able to present causal evidence on educational 
persistence. However, if we assume that genetic effects are the same between countries and 
across time, we can reasonably consider that genetics is not a real problem for our comparative 
approach; that is, the measure of educational mobility that we present might still be valid (even if 
with a descriptive interpretation).    
 
                                                 
1 The reader can consult Erikson and Goldthorpe (2002), Esping-Andersen (2004), and Goldthorpe and Mills (2005) for a 
comprehensive review of the sociological literature on intergenerational mobility. 
2 The special feature of these studies is the use of special samples (twin parents, or adoptees) that allow ruling out the effect of 
genetic ability. The other usual technique is consists in exploiting the exogenous variations in parental schooling produced by 
educational reforms (see, Chevalier 2004, or Oreopoulus et al. 2006). 
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  In fact, other studies (as this one) are explicitly focused on the “measurement” of educational 
mobility in a descriptive sense. The first important contribution concerning this concrete topic is 
from Checchi et al. (1999), in which the authors compare educational mobility (and income 
inequality) in Italy and in the US, concluding that Italy has lower levels of mobility than the US 
despite having lower levels of inequality. Comi (2003) compares earnings and educational 
mobility in Europe, using the data from the young sample of the ECHP (that is, she only 
considers individuals who are still living with their parents, which provokes serious problems of 
sample selection); she reports low levels of mobility for countries in southern Europe, France 
and Ireland, high levels for Nordic countries, the Netherlands and Austria and an intermediate 
position for Belgium and Germany. Another study from Chevalier et al. (2009) compares 
educational mobility within European countries using data from the International Adult Literacy 
Survey (IALS); his general results suggest that educational mobility is negatively correlated with 
educational inequality and that the degree of mobility has increased over time. Moreover, he also 
finds that Nordic countries are the most mobile ones and that the less mobile are Germany, Italy, 
Ireland and Poland. There is also a recent contribution of Checchi et al. (2008), in which they 
analyse educational persistence across cohorts in Italy; they find that, even if mobility has 
increased over time, the relative disadvantage of individuals from poor backgrounds persists up 
to the end of the period considered. Finally, Hertz et al. (2008) compare the temporal patterns of 
the intergenerational persistence of education for 42 different countries, considering different 
measures of mobility (namely, the intergenerational regression coefficient and the parent-child 
correlation in educational attainment); their results show a significant heterogeneity between 
countries but also with respect to the measure of mobility considered. Even so, they suggest that 
northern European countries display the lowest persistence, while the highest records of 
persistence are those of Latin America countries.    
 
Given the research background on educational mobility, our contribution to the existing 
literature is threefold. First, we propose a new index for measuring intergenerational mobility, 
which considers both absolute and relative changes in the intergenerational association of 
educational attainment. That is, as we explain below, our measure of mobility takes into account 
changes in intergenerational persistence (the beta coefficient, or the relative measure of mobility) 
and the relative variances of years of schooling3 between parents’ and children’s generations 
(more specifically, the R-squared of the intergenerational regression). Note that the necessity of 
jointly considering these two components, in order to obtain a clear picture of mobility 
                                                 
3 We consider educational mobility in terms of the “imputed” years of education, derived from the information on the highest 
completed level of education in terms of ISCED levels (Unesco 1997); we will return to this point later. 
3
 (especially for comparison purposes), has been considered by Hertz et al. (2008) and by Checchi 
et al. (2008).     
 
Second, we believe that the intergenerational transmission of education is a process that 
simultaneously involves both parents, even if to different extents; however, educational mobility 
has generally been computed with respect to a single measure of parental education (father’s 
education, the highest level between the two parents, the mean level, etc.). We are able to 
compute the mobility index as a weighted mean of mobility with respect to the father and 
mobility with respect to the mother. In this way, we take into account the potential parental 
assortative mating with respect to education (i.e., parents match in the marriage market according 
to human capital), which can reinforce the degree of educational transmission, as we explain 
below. Moreover, we are also able to obtain the separate contribution of both parents and check 
whether and when (in terms of time) educational persistence with respect to the two parents 
converges to the same level. 
 
Third, with this study, we try to fill the lack of European evidence on intergenerational 
mobility in a comparative perspective (in particular for Central and Southern countries). In fact, 
we apply our methodology to 12 European countries4 with homogeneous data from the 2005 
wave of EU-SILC, which contains retrospective information about parental education and family 
characteristics at the age of 14. Moreover, by computing our standardised measure of 
intergenerational mobility separately for different birth cohorts (eight five-year birth cohorts), we 
are able to analyse in a consistent way the temporal patterns of educational mobility in several 
European countries over a long time period (that is, for individuals born between 1940 and 
1980).  
 
Indeed, the analysis of time patterns has already captured the attention of many researchers 
on intergenerational socio-economic mobility (see, for example, Ermisch and Francesconi 2004, 
Mayer and Loopo 2005, Nicoletti and Ermisch 2007, and Lee and Solon 2009). This is due to the 
fact that examining temporal changes and its comparison across countries enables the 
contemplation of how institutional changes affect intergenerational mobility. There are different 
institutions that may simultaneously affect intergenerational mobility (in income, but also in 
education). For example, the labour market, by determining in a broad sense “the return to 
education”, influences the incentives to invest more or less in a child’s human capital. Moreover, 
                                                 
4 Namely: Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden (Nordic Countries); Austria, Belgium, France and the Netherlands 
(Continental Countries); Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain (Southern Countries). 
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 the educational system can affect the cost of this investment by modifying the general 
availability and the quantity of educational resources.  
 
However, the labour market and the educational system are not the only institutions that may 
affect intergenerational mobility. As noted by many authors (for example, Esping-Andersen 
2004, Nicoletti and Ermisch 2007), the family represents the other important institution that 
exerts important effects on socio-economic persistence. According to this intuition, another 
important innovation of this contribution is that we explicitly model the effect of family 
characteristics on the degree of observed mobility in years of schooling. With a similar logic of 
the methodology in Blanden et al. (2007)5, we consider family characteristics mediating 
variables in the intergenerational persistence of educational attainment. Specifically, we analyse 
the extent to which the statistical association between parental education and family 
characteristics modifies the intergenerational transmission process; in other words, we determine 
how educational persistence (the estimated intergenerational elasticity parameter) is affected by 
the relationship between parental education and family characteristics.  
 
We argue that the relationship between parental educational background and family 
characteristics reinforces the link between parental education and child’s education; in other 
words, if family characteristics were not associated with parental education, intergenerational 
mobility would be higher. For family characteristics, we use all the relevant information 
contained in the 2005 wave of the EU-SILC: namely, a) the number of siblings, b) family 
structure, c) the frequency of financial problems in the family, d) parental labour status and 
family socio-economic status (clearly related to parental education). Moreover, as explained in 
the next section, we implicitly consider as family characteristics d) the potential parental 
assortative mating according to education. This means that we will be able to quantify the 
contribution of parental assortative mating (as for others family characteristics) on observed 
educational mobility. Therefore, in the next section, we first define our intergenerational 
mobility index, emphasising its descriptive properties. Later, we proceed to illustrate how this 
index enables the linking of family characteristics with intergenerational mobility.  
 
With these purposes in mind, for the rest of the paper, we proceed as follows: in section 2, we 
review relevant elements of previous research, highlighting how we complement the existing 
                                                 
5 The logic is similar but the idea behind it is different: they consider how education, ability, non-cognitive skills and labour 
market experience affect the intergenerational income transmission mechanism. They suggest that the association between these 
factors, parental income and individual earnings explain a significant part of intergenerational transmission; moreover, the 
temporal change of these relationships accounts for the 80% of the decline on intergenerational mobility in the UK.  
5
 evidence with the present contribution. Section 3 is dedicated to the definition of the mobility 
index, to the description of its properties (3.1), and to the methodology for obtaining a linkage 
between family characteristics and educational mobility (3.2). Section 4 contains the empirical 
results from the baseline index and its temporal patterns (4.1) as well as from the simulation, 
which allows accounting for the effect of family characteristics (4.2). In section 5, we discuss the 
results, and section 6 concludes.  
 
 
2. Empirical Methodology 
 
2.1 Defining the Educational Mobility Index 
 
Traditionally, much of the empirical research on socio-economic mobility has been centred 
on measuring the “degree” of the intergenerational transmission of socio-economic status; 
focusing on education mobility, one may describe the statistical association between parental 
education and child outcomes by using probabilistic measures such as transition matrices (or 
derived indices) described in Checchi (2006) and adopted by Comi (2003), Chevalier et al. 
(2007), and by Heineck and Riphnahn (2009). An alternative consists of the use of regression 
coefficients between the child’s and the parents’ years of completed schooling or correlation 
coefficients, which respectively represent a relative and an absolute or standardised measure of 
intergenerational educational persistence. In fact, as suggested by Hertz et al. (2007) and by 
Checchi et al. (2008), the regression coefficient contains the ratio between the variances of the 
offspring’s years of education and the parents’ years of education; this means that an increase in 
the variance of parental education (relative to the variance of child’s education) may distort the 
measure of mobility. Indeed, the correlation coefficient represents an absolute or standardised 
measure of mobility because it is normalised with respect to changes in inequalities in education 
for the children’s and/or the parent’s generations6.     
 
Nevertheless, as also noted by Checchi et al. (2008), these measures of intergenerational 
mobility neglect the potential effect of parental “assortative mating” on human capital. As 
mentioned above, a higher degree of parental matching according to education may strengthen 
the degree of educational transmission through the quality-quantity trade-off channels (better-
                                                 
6 Moreover, Checchi et al. (2008) propose an intuitive decomposition of the correlation coefficient, whose results are very 
appealing for the analysis of temporal changes because it might account for changes in composition effects and thus provide the 
“correct measure for analysing intergenerational transmission of education” (the marginal probability of child’s education, 
conditional to that of the parents). 
6
 educated parents have fewer children but invest more resources in their human capital). 
However, regression or correlation coefficients (but also the transition matrices) are usually 
estimated with respect to a single proxy of parental education (father’s education, higher 
completed parental education, mean parental education, etc.), ignoring that i) both parents 
“transmit” education to the child, and ii) the relation between paternal and maternal education 
may strengthen the degree of global persistence in educational attainment.  
 
In order to obtain a measure of education mobility that simultaneously allows for 
intergenerational transmission with respect to both parents and consistently captures the absolute 
and the relative components of intergenerational mobility, we generalise the mobility index 
proposed by Raymond et al. (2009). In particular, defining as c the natural logarithm of child’s 
years of education (c = ln(Sc), where Sc represents the imputed years of education of the child), f  
represents the natural logarithm of father’s years of education (f = ln(Sf)) and m  represents the 
natural logarithm of mother’s years of education (m = ln(Sm)), an index of educational mobility 
may be defined as7 
                                ( ) ( )( ) ( )
2 2
2 2 2 2
.c f c mEM
c f c m
I
σ σ
σ σ σ σ
− −+= + + + .                                                          (1) 
According to the index proposed, in cases of perfect mobility, where the education of the 
father (mother) is completely transmitted to the child, it follows that 
2 2 2
( - ) 2 0c f c f cfσ σ σ σ= + − = ( 2 2 2( - ) 2 0c m c m cmσ σ σ σ= + − = ). In the opposite situation, if the 
correlation between father’s (mother’s) and child’s years of schooling is zero, we obtain the case 
of perfect mobility, as it results that 2 2 2( - )c f c fσ σ σ= +  ( 2 2 2( - )c m c mσ σ σ= + ). That is, the mobility 
index proposed always takes a value between zero (perfect immobility) and one (perfect 
mobility), respectively. Moreover, this mobility index allows decomposing the global observed 
mobility between mobility with respect to parental education, mobility with respect to maternal 
education, and their respective weights. This is because, with simple algebra, it is possible to 
specify the index as 
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7 Note that the proposed index follows a well-defined empirical distribution, given than each of its elements converges in 
distribution to a χ2; therefore, we are also able to report bootstrapped 70% confidence interval for the mobility index. 
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where 
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and λf + λm= 1. This decomposition could be very useful if one is interested in the analysis of a 
cross-country comparison of temporal changes in education mobility (as in the present study). In 
fact, fathers and mothers may transmit education to their offspring in very different ways, and 
such differences could change with time and across countries. Moreover, as explained in what 
follows, defining mobility with respect to both parents offers the appealing possibility of 
simulating the degree of intergenerational mobility in the case of absence of assortative mating 
(that is, no statistical relationships between fathers’ and mothers’ education levels). 
 
Finally, we illustrate why this index accounts for both relative and absolute intergenerational 
mobility. That is, our mobility index takes into account not only changes of child’s and parents’, 
mean years of education but also changes in the inequality (i.e., the variances) of educational 
attainment in both child’s and parents’ generations. From the estimation of the following 
intergenerational equations of educational attainment,  
                      
( )
( )
ˆ ˆˆ ˆln( ) ln( ) ln( ) ln( )
ˆ ˆˆ ˆln( ) ln( ) ln( ) ln( )
c c f f f f f f
c c m m m m m m
S S S S c f
S S S S c m
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β ε β ε
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,                    (3) 
which relates the logarithm of child’s years of education with the logarithm of parental and 
maternal years of education, respectively, it is straightforward to express the mobility index as 
      ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )[ ] ( ) ( ) 44444 34444 21444 3444 21
2
22
1
22
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22
ˆ1ˆ111
2 mmffumfmfc
mcfcEM RRI ωβωβωσσσ
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where the two R-squared are obtained from the respective intergenerational regressions, and   
          ( ) ( ) ( ),2;2;2 222
2
222
2
222
2
mfc
m
m
mfc
f
f
mfc
c
u σσσ
σωσσσ
σωσσσ
σω ++=++=++=     (4a) 
represent the weight of each component, with ωu + ωf + ωm =1. In words, this last 
reparameterisation allows decomposing total observed mobility as the weighted sum of two 
components: 1) the lack of explanatory power of parental education over child’s education 
recovered by the R-squared component (representing the relative variances of parents’ and 
child’s years of schooling), and 2) the lack of intergenerational persistency in educational 
attainment, namely the relative measure of educational mobility. As documented by Hertz. et al. 
8
 (2008), these two components may behave very differently. Therefore, considering only one of 
the two (namely, the persistence component) may provide misleading results on the 
intergenerational mobility of education: this would be especially true if the purpose of the 
analysis consisted of a cross-country comparison of temporal changes.  
 
2.2 Linking Mobility and Family Characteristics 
 
Apart from measuring intergenerational educational mobility and its different components, 
the index proposed here holds another interesting property for the analysis of education 
transmission. In general, the degree to which the socio-economic status of a given generation is 
inherited from the previous one may be related to a wide set of elements, many of them 
observables. Among these observable elements, we can consider on the one hand “institutional 
factors” (in a broad meaning, i.e. the educational system and the labour market), and on the 
other, “educational circumstances”, mainly located within the other relevant institution: the 
family8. Focusing on the latter element, the proposed index enables the analysis of the extent to 
which the covariance between parents’ and child’s education is affected by the statistical 
association between parental schooling and educational circumstances at the family level. In 
other words, defining educational circumstances as the set of family characteristics during the 
childhood (which act as determinants of individual schooling)9, we can exploit the mobility 
index for assessing the effect of removing the potential relationship between these elements and 
the estimated intergenerational persistence parameter (namely, the betas in eq. 4). As explained 
in what follows, this would be done by relating the estimation of beta coefficients from the 
simple linear regression models in (3), with the estimation of the intergenerational elasticity 
parameter(s) in a multivariate regression model.  
 
Let us suppose that the data generation process for completed years of schooling might be 
represented by an Extended Measurement Model with k covariates, including father’s and 
mother’s education. After the OLS estimation, this model takes the form  
                                  uWuRmfc mf ~'~~'
~~~ ** +=+++= ψδββ ,                                           (5) 
 
 
                                                 
8 Unfortunately, we cannot analyse the effect of school-level educational circumstances, of school quality, educational resources, 
neighbourhood and peer effects. This is due to the fact that, in general, there are no retrospective data that also cover school 
variables; moreover, the information about where the individuals were living at the age of 14 is not available in the EU-SILC 
database. 
9 Namely, a) family composition, b) frequency of financial problems during the childhood, c) parental labour situation and 
occupation, and implicitly d) educational assortative mating; see section 2.2 and table 2 of the Appendix for details. 
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where ( )* *, ,k f mψ β β δ′ = % % %%  represents the coefficient vector estimates, and Wk×N=( f, m, R), where 
k×N is the matrix containing the full set of explanatory variables (specifically, the logarithm of 
parental years of education and the other family characteristics in R). Therefore, the betas’ OLS 
estimators from the bivariate measurement models in (3) can be written as 
                           
( ) ( ) ( )
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,                              (6) 
where Wf and Wm represent the matrix W, excluding the elements f and m, respectively (the same 
applies for the coefficient vector). The mechanical orthogonality between the OLS residuals (u% ) 
and the regressors of the Extended Model in (5) enables the obtaining of the following 
representation of the persistence parameter estimates from the bivariate measurement models 
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Note that this represents exactly the classical result from OLS estimation with omitted variables. 
These equations suggest that the relative degree of (im)mobility, captured by the coefficient 
estimates from the bivariate measurement models in (3), could be expressed as the sum of two 
elements: the estimated elasticity with respect to father’s (mother’s) education from the Extended 
Model, and another component that represents the link between one parent’s education and the 
rest of the variables included in the matrix W (denoted by A for the father and by B for the 
mother, respectively). Indeed, from the basic algebraic properties of the OLS estimator, we can 
retrieve the A and B components (6a), by making use of the coefficient estimates from the 
following 2×(k-1) auxiliary regressions, 
                             
( )
( ) BWmmmmW
AWffffW
mmmmm
fffff
==⇒+=
==⇒+=
−
−
''ˆˆˆ'
''ˆˆˆ'
1
1
γνγ
γνγ
.                                          (7)  
This result implies that the coefficient estimates from the simple linear regressions that relates 
the logarithm of child’s years of education to the logarithm of father’s and mother’s years of 
education, respectively, should be represented by the sum of the parameters estimates of parental 
years of schooling ( *,f mβ% ) from the extended model and by the cross-product between the 
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 estimated coefficients from the (k-1) auxiliary regressions ( ,ˆf mγ ) and the rest of estimated 
parameters from eq. (5) ( ,f mψ% ); in formulas, 
                            
( )
( ) mmmm
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A
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In order to exploit these results for the analysis of intergenerational mobility, remember that the 
index can also be defined with respect to the beta coefficients from equation (3). If we replace 
them with their respective estimations in formula (8), we get  
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As mentioned above, this specification of the mobility index allows exploring how the link 
between parental education and the other family characteristics included in the Extended Model 
may potentially affect the observed educational mobility by modifying the estimated value of the 
betas (which represents the degree of intergenerational educational persistence). Specifically, 
with this approximation, we can ask, for example, which would have been the degree of 
intergenerational mobility in educational attainment in the hypothetical situation of no systematic 
relationships between the family characteristic (j) (contained in matrix R) and parental years of 
education. The answer may be found in the computation of the simulated mobility index, given 
by 
( ) ( )[ ] ( )( )
( )( ) ;~ˆ~ˆ~ˆ~ˆ~1
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11111111
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2
11111111
*22
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that is, removing the j-component of the estimated values of the betas in equations (8) (which is 
equivalent to supposing that the covariance between parental education and the family 
characteristic (j) is zero).  
 
We operationalise this methodology for the analysis of education mobility by formulating the 
following question: what would have been the degree of educational mobility in the hypothetical 
11
 case of breaking the statistical association between absolute education mobility and the complete 
set of educational circumstances at the family level? This kind of empirical ceiling of the 
intergenerational mobility of schooling might be computed by removing from the formula of the 
simulated index all of the k-1 cross products ( , ,ˆf m f mγ ψ× % ). In general, what we expect is a higher 
degree of mobility, as in some way, family characteristics could reinforce the connection 
between parental education and children’s attainment. As explained before, this means that we 
consider family characteristics to be mediating variables in the statistical association between 
parents’ and child’s education.   
 
However, even cutting the statistical connection between absolute mobility and family 
characteristics (via parental education), we still expect some degree of intergenerational 
educational persistence; this is because the strength of the association between parental and 
child’s schooling is also determined by important institutional elements (Solon (2004), Hassler et 
al. (2007)). In this sense, cross-country differences in this “residual” persistence may arise from 
the extent of comprehensiveness of the educational system, from the age of initial tracking into 
different types of education (academic, vocational, etc.), or from other relevant features of the 
educational system. Nevertheless, changes in residual persistence may also be the result of 
differences in the labour market, related to the returns to human capital (i.e., the degree of skill 
bias in the productive technology, labour market regulation, segmentation etc.). In a broad sense, 
we might interpret the residual persistence as the (net) institutional effects on educational 
mobility (also net of the potential interaction between institutional effects and family 
characteristics)10.  
 
Additionally, we can also check the extent to which each component of educational 
circumstances (significantly) contributes to the observed degree of educational persistence across 
generations. Removing each of the k-1 ( , ,ˆf m f mγ ψ× % ) components from the simulated mobility index 
formula, it would be possible to analyse the impact of every element of family characteristics 
(contained in matrix R) on the observed educational mobility. In other words, we will check 
whether and how each element of family characteristics modifies the estimates of 
intergenerational persistence in the years of education. Note also that, by the definition of the 
mobility index, educational assortative mating is implicitly considered among family 
characteristics. This is because the index is defined with respect to (a weighted sum of) mobility 
                                                 
10 Note that the estimated residual mobility could also be the result of unmeasured family characteristics and/or other elements 
acting as determinants of educational attainment; as in the case of genetic ability, if we assume that such elements are the same 
between countries and across time, the interpretation of the results might still be valid. 
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 with respect of the father and mobility with respect of the mother. This implies that the first 
component of the matrix Wf (Wm) represents the log of mother’s (father’s) years of education. 
Therefore, the first ( ,ˆf mγ ) estimates from the auxiliary regressions in (7) represent a parent’s years 
of education elasticity with respect to his/her spouse’s schooling: in other words, they represent 
the extent of educational assortative mating among the parents. This would mean that removing 
from the simulated index the first ( , ,ˆf m f mγ ψ× % ) components (that is, supposing that there is no 
statistical association between parents’ years of completed schooling), we should quantify which 
is the contribution of educational assortative mating to the observed degree of intergenerational 
persistence in educational attainment (an issue that, to the best of our knowledge, has only been 
considered by Güell et al. 2007). 
 
 
3. Empirical Results 
 
The empirical analysis has been realised with the data from the 2005 wave of EU-SILC 
(European Survey on Income and Living Conditions) of 12 countries, divided into three groups 
according to the following standard classification: namely, Denmark, Finland, Norway and 
Sweden defined as Nordic countries. Austria, Belgium, France and the Netherlands, defined as 
Continental countries; and Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain as the group of Southern countries. 
As commented above, we consider the 2005 wave because it contains retrospective information 
about family composition and parental background when the individual was 14 years old, which 
is considered the crucial age for a child’s educational process. This particular wave of the 
European Survey also allows splitting the sample into eight sub-samples of five-year birth 
cohorts for each country11. In order to compute the mobility index as in equations (1)-(2), we 
impute individuals’, fathers’ and mothers’ years of education from the information about 
completed education defined according to the ISCED classification; years of completed 
education are imputed in the same way for individuals than for parents, consistent with the 
normal (country-specific) expected length of each ISCED level12.  
                                                 
11 Given that the additional questionnaire about family characteristics during childhood in the EU-SILC is only directed at 
individuals aged between 25 and 65 in 2005, we consider the first birth cohort 1940-45 and the last 1975-80. Table 1 contains the 
complete definition of birth cohorts, and the number of observation for each cohort for the selected European Countries.  In the 
case of Denmark, we cannot consider the first two birth cohorts (1940-45 and 1945-50), because the information about maternal 
education is not reliable (namely, maternal education in the first two cohorts is fixed for all observation to ISCED2); we preferred 
excluding these two initial cohorts from the analysis rather than computing mobility only with respect to parental education. 
12 In table 2, we report the detailed information about the conversion of ISCED levels into equivalent years of education; note 
also that we retain observations of native-born individuals who are not still studying in the year of the survey (2005), with valid 
information about own, paternal and maternal completed education. We use only the sub-sample of native-born individuals 
because a) we aimed to relate the patterns of educational mobility to institutional changes, and b) we want to avoid including 
individuals who have been potentially exposed to different institutional environments. For brevity reasons, we neglect gender 
differences, which will be an issue of future research on this topic. 
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3.1 Baseline Mobility Index: Levels, Temporal Patterns and the Role of Father and Mother. 
 
The analysis of the baseline mobility index, computed separately for each birth cohort13 and 
for each country, can give us an impression of i) which is the global degree of educational 
persistence in Europe and ii) how educational mobility has evolved over 40 years (that is, for 
individuals born between 1940 and 1980). Figures 1a-c represent the temporal evolution of the 
mobility index with the (bootstrapped) confidence interval in solid lines (the same information is 
also contained in table 4); moreover, the figures also report iii) the separate contribution of 
mobility with respect to the father and mobility with respect to the mother in dashed and dot-
dashed lines, respectively.   
 
With respect to the first point, in general we observe that the degree of educational mobility 
is always higher in Nordic countries than in the rest, with an important exception in the case of 
France, which shows very high levels of educational mobility over the entire period, which is 
probably due to its free and very open educational system. The rest of the Continental countries 
are situated in an intermediate position in our country grouping, although Belgium displays 
somewhat lower levels of mobility than Austria and the Netherlands. As expected, Southern 
countries exhibit very low levels of educational mobility, particularly if compared to Nordic 
countries (apart from the case of Greece, which shows fairly higher levels of mobility than the 
rest of the group).     
 
Regarding the temporal evolution of educational persistence, we might claim that, in general, 
educational mobility has increased in the period in the 12 European countries analysed. 
However, as also noted by Chevalier et al. (2009), the tendency is heterogeneous enough among 
countries, mainly depending on the starting point (that is, on the degree of educational mobility 
in the first birth cohort 1940-45). In fact, for countries that exhibit high levels of mobility in the 
first cohorts (for example, the Nordic countries), educational persistence seems rather stable over 
the 40 years considered. Confirming this intuition, the same happens for France (with initial 
mobility close to 0.8), and to a less extent in Austria (starting with values around 0.7), where the 
evolution of educational mobility is roughly constant over the entire time span14. Moreover, in 
                                                 
13 As in Nicoletti and Ermisch (2007), or in Mayer and Loopo (2005) we have also tested a rolling specification, by progressively 
adding one year to each five-year birth cohort (1940-45, 1942-46 an so on); however, this specification does not modify the 
general results, nor does it affect the temporal patterns of the mobility index (it only artificially increases the number of points in 
which the mobility index is calculated).  
14 Note that in Austria there is a pronounced inflection between the 1940-45 cohort and the 1955-60 cohort, which is probably 
due to a WWII effect on educational mobility; however, educational mobility is essentially stable up to the end of the period.  
14
 the case of Denmark, the intergenerational persistence of educational attainment increases to 
some extent in the last cohorts (mobility reduced by approximately 0.1), probably because this 
country held very high levels of mobility at the beginning of the period15. Among the Nordic 
countries, this common behaviour is only broken in the Norwegian case, where the initial 
mobility was of 0.66 (relatively lower than in the rest of high-mobility countries); nevertheless, 
in this country, mobility substantially increases over time, with an important jump of 0.1 points 
between 1955-60 and 1960-65, approaching a final value of 0.8 (mean rate of increase of 0.025 
per cohort).  
 
[FIGURES 1a-1c ABOUT HERE] 
 
Additionally, we observe a moderate and stable increase in educational mobility for Belgium 
(apart from the fluctuation in the first three cohorts) and for the Netherlands; indeed, these 
countries exhibit a mean rate of increase of educational mobility of approximately 0.02 points 
per cohort, rising above the value of 0.7 at the end of the period16. Focusing now on the Southern 
countries, it appears that Greece has also experienced a significant increase in educational 
mobility during the 40 years analysed; in this country, the average increase of the mobility index 
over the birth cohorts is very similar to that of the Belgian or of the Dutch case (0.02 per cohort 
excluding the last one). However, the increase of educational mobility is not so pronounced in 
the rest of the Southern countries; indeed, Portugal exhibits the lowest general degree of 
educational mobility, with a very reduced tendency of increase (apart from a discrete jump 
between 1955-60 and 1965-70). Moreover, Italy and Spain evidently experience an increase in 
educational mobility (an average increase of 0.014 for each cohort), but both countries maintain 
considerably lower levels of mobility than other European countries. Moreover, it appears that 
educational mobility increases in the first half of the period (probably due to the post-war 
economic recovery and income growth), and then stabilises during the second half for Italy 
(specifically, from the 1960-65 birth cohort); conversely, for Spain, educational mobility is 
roughly constant until the 1960-65 birth cohort but rises markedly during the rest of the period 
considered. 
 
                                                 
15 Unfortunately, as commented above, we cannot provide a measure of educational mobility in the first cohorts, due to problems 
with the information about completed maternal education; however, we suppose that educational mobility at the starting point 
was significantly high in Denmark.    
16 Note that in both Belgium and the Netherlands but also in Greece, educational mobility seems to decline in the last cohort 
(1975-80); however, this may just be the result of the exclusion from the sample of those individuals who are still studying in the 
year of the survey (2005). Reasonably, these individuals are enrolled in higher education, and dropping them from the sample 
may be apparently reducing the observed degree of mobility in this cohort; in fact, in order to avoid distorting the results, the 
mean rate of increase of 0.2 has been computed with respect to the first seven cohorts. 
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 Finally, we can analyse the separate contributions of parental and maternal completed 
education to the global level of educational mobility and how the role of both parents changes 
over time. The results suggest that, in general, child’s education is strongly attached to paternal 
education rather than to maternal education. In a nutshell, we observe higher levels of 
educational persistence with respect to the father than with respect to the mother, with an 
important exception in the case of Austria (where child’s education is highly associated with 
maternal education). However, for many countries, mobility with respect to the father and 
mobility with respect to the mother are statistically the same for the greater part of the period, 
given that both are included within the confidence interval of the mobility index: this is the case 
of Nordic countries (with a small exception for Finland17), but the same happens for Belgium and 
Greece.  
 
Nevertheless, for other countries, we observe a well-defined temporal convergence of 
educational mobility with respect to the two parents. That is, in Austria, maternal education is 
more attached to child education until the 1965-70 birth cohort, but mobility with respect to the 
mother and mobility with respect to the father are later practically identical. With a reverse role 
of fathers and mothers, the convergence occurs in the same cohort for France and for the 
Netherlands, but for Spain, the convergence between educational mobility with respect to the 
two parents takes place in the previous cohort, 1960-65 (note that it is the same cohort in which 
educational mobility starts to increase, following the implementation of the compulsory 
education reform, which took place after 1970). Probably, this general convergence of mobility 
with respect to fathers and mothers is due to the tendency of equalisation of educational 
attainment between males and females (in the parents’ generation). Conversely, there is no 
convergence in the case of Italy, where child’s education is more attached to parental education 
that maternal education during the entire period; for Portugal, it seems that only at the end of the 
period does maternal education matter than paternal education.   
 
 Having analysed the general results from the analysis of educational mobility and its temporal 
evolution, we now move to examining the effect of family characteristics on educational 
mobility. The results from the simulations described in section 3.2 allow understanding which 
part of the observed degree of educational mobility is accounted for by other family 
characteristics. In other words, we want to check to what extent family characteristics act as a 
mediating factor in the statistical relationship between parental and child’s education. 
                                                 
17 In this country, there is a clear switch in the role of the two parents in the 1965-70cohort: in fact, before, this cohort child’s 
education is more attached to parental education, but maternal education later has the strongest effect until the end of the period.  
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 3.2 Simulation Results: Intergenerational Mobility and Family Characteristics   
 
In this section, we examine the temporal patterns of the “residual” persistence (the 
complement to 1 of the mobility simulated index, without any family characteristic), and the 
contribution that educational circumstances at the family level have on the observed degree of 
educational mobility. First of all, we need to specify the vector of family characteristics (R) 
included in the Extended Measurement Model (5); we exploit all the relevant information about 
family characteristics (when the individual was 14 years old), which is contained in the 
Intergenerational Transmission of Poverty Module of the 2005 wave of EU-SILC. Specifically, 
apart from parental and maternal (log) years of education, we include in the extended model a 
gender indicator, the number of siblings, an indicator of intact family (living with both parents), 
the frequency of financial problems during childhood (categorical, from 1 to 5), and two 
indicators that take the value of 1 if the father/mother was unemployed or inactive; finally, we 
also include an index of family socio-economic status (ISEI)18. Detailed information about the 
variables included in the vector of family characteristics is contained in Table 3. 
 
Table 4 contains the baseline mobility index for each country and birth cohort and five 
versions of the simulated index: namely, in the index A) we eliminate all the k-1 cross products 
( , ,ˆf m f mγ ψ× % ), which means that we are hypothetically cutting the link between parental education 
and the entire set of family characteristics. The rest of the simulated indexes (B-E) enable the 
analysis of the following hypothetical situations: we consider which would be the degree of 
educational mobility B) with no statistical association between parental education and the 
frequency of financial problems in the family when the individual was 14 years old; or C) 
removing the statistical association between parental education and the number of siblings. 
Moreover, we consider D) the degree of educational mobility without any relationship between 
parental education and socio-economic status or, finally, E) cutting the potential correlation 
between parental and maternal education (in other words, the potential educational assortative 
mating)19. In what follows, we also describe the (relative) contribution of each of these elements 
                                                 
18 The (international) socioeconomic status index (ISEI) is defined in terms of parental occupation, according to Ganzeboom et 
al. (1992); in order to obtain a proxy of “family” socio-economic status, we take the highest ISEI between the two parents. Note 
that, unfortunately, the Swedish data do not contain information about parental occupation or about the number of siblings. 
Moreover, for Greece and Portugal, the information about the frequency of financial problems during the childhood is not 
provided. For these countries, we specify the Extended Measurement Model with the rest of variables; therefore, because of this 
data limitation, the simulation results for Sweden, Greece and Portugal must be considered with caution. 
19 The first simulation allows for comparing changes in the degree of “residual mobility” across countries and cohorts. Moreover, 
we only report the results from these some selected simulations because financial problems, siblings, socioeconomic status and 
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 to the total effect of family characteristics. The same information can also be inspected with the 
graphic representation in Figures 2a-2c for the three groups of European countries, respectively. 
 
The analysis of residual educational persistence (the complement to one of the simulated 
mobility index (A)) represents the degree of intergenerational persistence once accounting for the 
total contribution of family characteristics. This indicates, in a broad sense, the net effect of the 
labour market and educational institutions in generating persistence in educational attainment. 
Such effects appear to be increasing in the case of Denmark and Finland, indicating that in these 
two Nordic countries, the (independent) role of institutions seems to increase with the course of 
time. For the rest of countries, it decreases (with the exception of France and Italy, which show 
more stable values) but it never approaches the value of zero, suggesting that institutions always 
play a role in intergenerational persistence in some way. In fact, residual mobility decreases to 
the value of 0.1 for Norway, Sweden, Austria, Belgium, France, and, to a lesser extent, for 
Greece. Nevertheless, it remains higher for Italy, Portugal and Spain. Note that residual mobility 
is also higher for the Netherlands, suggesting that this country evidently appears highly mobile, 
but this result is mainly guaranteed by the role of institutions.  
 
 [FIGURES 2a-2c ABOUT HERE] 
 
As an initial step for describing the role of the family in educational mobility, we compute 
the global impact of family characteristics on educational persistence20; the results obtained 
provide a general picture describing the total contribution of family characteristics on the 
observed persistence of educational attainment. The effect of removing the statistical association 
between parental years of schooling and educational circumstances at the family level is 
especially low in Nordic countries. In particular, the global effect of family characteristics 
clearly decreases with time for Finland and for Norway (less than 0.1 in the lasts cohorts) and is 
almost stable for Denmark and Sweden (0.1 for the former and 0.08 for the latter). On the 
contrary, the total effect of family characteristics is clearly higher for Southern countries, as in 
these countries, a significant component of the observed intergenerational persistence in 
educational attainment is represented by the contribution of family characteristics: specifically, it 
accounts for something less than 0.2 points for Greece, Italy and Spain and something more than 
the same value for Portugal. With respect to this last point, two findings for Continental 
                                                                                                                                                                           
assortative mating are the only factors that significantly affect educational mobility. Nevertheless, detailed decompositions and 
estimation results are not reported here but are available upon request by the authors. 
20 The impact of family characteristics on intergenerational persistence in educational attainment is computed as the difference 
between global observed persistence (1-baseline index) and the simulated persistence without the effect of educational 
circumstances at the family level (1-simulated index A). 
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 European countries are somewhat unexpected: the impact of family characteristics on observed 
mobility is considerably high in Belgium (between 0.15 and 0.25) but is very low in the 
Netherlands (less than 0.15); this confirms that, in terms of educational attainment, the latter 
country appears to be a high-mobility country. The statistical association with family 
characteristics has also a small contribution to observed persistence in France; however, in this 
country, the effect of family characteristics increases to some extent in the last cohort. Moreover, 
the contribution of family characteristics to educational mobility tends to decrease over time in 
Austria (apart from the last two cohorts) and the Netherlands, indicating that in these countries, 
(as in Finland and in Norway) education transmission is less and less affected by familiar 
educational circumstances. On the contrary, for the rest of countries, the effect of educational 
circumstances at the family level remains almost constant over the period analysed (and 
increases in the case of Portugal). 
 
In order to obtain a better insight into the link between family characteristics and 
intergenerational mobility, we now move to analysing the most important components of 
educational circumstances at the family level. First, the graphical results presented in Figures 2a-
2c indicate that the frequency of financial problems during childhood (B) has no significant 
impact on educational mobility in Nordic and Continental countries (less than 10 percent of the 
total effect of family characteristics); however, the simulated mobility index (B) with no 
statistical association between parental education and the frequency of financial problems is 
slightly out of the confidence interval of the baseline index for Italy and for Spain, accounting 
for 10% of the estimated relationship among family characteristics and educational mobility. 
Unfortunately, the information about the frequency of financial problems is not available for 
Greece and Portugal; we expect that, particularly for these two Southern countries, this weak 
proxy for liquidity constraints21 could have an important effect on educational mobility.  
 
Second, the simulated mobility index (C) suggests that, in Nordic countries, the association 
between parental education and the number of siblings has a relatively low impact on educational 
persistence compared to other family characteristics (with the exception of Norway in the first 
four cohorts). For Continental countries, the presence of siblings also has a very small 
contribution for Belgium and for the Netherlands (confirming that the latter country behaves in a 
similar way to Nordic countries); somewhat higher effects are found in the case of Austria, but 
for France, the correlation between the number of siblings and parental education represents a 
                                                 
21 This is a weak proxy because this variable is i) subjective, and ii) potentially affected by recall problems; indeed, it is often 
called “subjective financial well-being”. Perhaps it is exactly for this reason that its effect on educational mobility is extremely 
low. In any case, its inclusion in the extended model is still interesting. 
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 very important component of family characteristics (accounting for about 20-30% of the total 
effect for a relevant part of the analysed period). Moreover, for Southern countries, the effect of 
siblings seems to increase with time, approaching a proportion of the total effect of family 
characteristics of about 15 percent in the last cohorts.  
 
Third, family socio-economic status (defined in terms of parental occupation) has a clear 
significant effect on educational persistence; that is, in general, the simulated mobility index (D), 
in which the existing statistical relationship between parental education and socio-economic 
status has been removed, exhibits higher levels of educational mobility. This would mean that an 
important component of the intergenerational persistence of educational attainment is related to 
the socio-economic status of the family. However, with respect to our countries’ grouping 
(Nordic, Continental and Southern), the relative effect of socio-economic status on educational 
mobility shows a reverse ranking. Indeed, the relative socio-economic component is higher in 
Nordic countries because it generally accounts for about the 50% of the statistical association 
between parental education and family characteristics. An intermediate position is occupied by 
Continental countries, where socio-economic status represents something less than one half of 
the effect of family characteristics (apart from the case of Austria). However, the relative effect 
of family socio-economic status in educational persistence (with respect to overall family 
characteristics) is lower for Southern countries; in these countries, the statistical association 
between parental education and socio-economic status shows a proportion between 20 and 45 
percent of the total effect of family characteristics. 
 
Finally, from the simulation results, we can claim that a relevant circumstance for 
educational mobility is the presence of educational assortative mating; as explained above, an 
important component of the statistical association between parental schooling and children’s 
achievements may be represented by the covariance between paternal and maternal education. 
Due to the mechanical of the mobility index proposed, the potential statistical relationship 
between the completed years of education of the two parents is implicitly considered as a family 
characteristic; this means that parental matching according to completed education could 
represent a (significant) component of the absolute degree of educational mobility. The evidence 
that the simulated index (E) is, in general, higher than the baseline indicates that 1) parental 
mating is assortative according to education and that 2) this reinforces the degree of 
intergenerational persistence in educational attainment. Concretely, about 40% of the family 
characteristics component of educational persistence can be attributed to the strong correlation in 
human capital between the parents. Moreover, the relative effect of (parental) educational 
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 assortative mating is almost constant over time, with the exception of Denmark and Finland, 
where the relative contribution of parental matching in educational mobility seems to increase 
across the cohorts22. 
 
 
4. Discussing the Results 
 
In this section, we try to analyse the obtained results concerning the degree of 
intergenerational mobility in educational attainment and its evolution across eight birth cohorts 
(1940-1980) in the selected European countries. Confirming the previous results, we find that 
Nordic European countries display higher levels of mobility than the other countries; moreover, 
our study also reports very high levels of educational mobility for France. Moreover, Continental 
countries are situated in an intermediate position, although, within the rest of countries of this 
group, Belgium exhibits lower levels of mobility than Austria and the Netherlands. Finally, as 
expected, Southern countries have the highest level of persistence in educational attainment.  
We claim that this heterogeneous picture of educational mobility in Europe is principally the 
product of differences in the educational systems and in the amount of public expenditure on 
education. Indeed, we show that Southern countries have a lower level of mobility, which is 
probably the result of the delayed implementation of compulsory school reforms, relative to 
Continental and Nordic countries (see Fort 2006 for a good review of educational reforms in 
Europe). Moreover, historically, the former countries invested substantially less public resources 
in education, which may have also constrained the degree of intergenerational mobility in 
educational attainment (as shown in table 4). Additionally, Nordic countries might display the 
highest level of mobility, as these countries were pioneers in introducing a comprehensive 
structure of secondary education; in fact, comprehensive secondary education considerably 
reduces the statistical association between child’s schooling and parental background (that is, a 
ceteris paribus increase in educational mobility). However, in order to fully explain the higher 
level of mobility in Nordic countries, as suggested by Hassler et al. (2007) we might also 
consider the higher level of wage compression and labour market rigidity in Southern and (to a 
lesser extent) in Continental countries, which may reduce educational mobility (because of the 
lower incentives to invest in children’s education).   
 
                                                 
22 Note also that in the Swedish case, assortative mating accounts for almost the 100% of family characteristics effects on 
educational mobility; indeed, this arise from the lack of relevant information about family characteristics in the Sweden data 
(concretely, parental occupation and the number of siblings).  
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 With respect to temporal patterns, we report a general increase of educational mobility during 
the 40 years considered: nevertheless, the tendency is not homogeneous and mainly depends on 
the starting point (that is, the degree of mobility reported for the first cohort). Indeed, the rate of 
increase of educational mobility is higher for those countries with the lowest level of mobility in 
the first birth cohort (1940-45); furthermore, it remains almost stable over time for those 
countries with very high initial mobility (Nordic countries, except Norway, and France).  
 
The most important message from the evidence on the temporal patterns is that there exists a 
sort of ceiling of educational mobility; that is, in countries where the degree of educational 
mobility was already very high at the beginning of the period, mobility remains stable or even 
decreases. This means that, to some extent, educational attainment is always related to parental 
background, regardless of the design of the educational system or of the amount of public 
expenditure on education. However, we must also emphasise the significant improvements in 
educational mobility experienced for many Southern and Continental countries during the period 
analysed. For the latter, we observe a clear tendency of convergence to the levels of mobility of 
the Nordic countries. However, for the former group, the complete convergence is still very 
distant, occurring at the end of the period. Even so, we believe that with data referring to a more 
recent period of time, we may have observed a further reduction of the distance between 
Southern and Nordic countries in terms of educational mobility23.  
   
Regarding the separate contributions of fathers and mothers, we observe that for Nordic 
countries, Belgium and Greece, there is no statistical distinction between the two. On the 
contrary, for the rest of the countries, individual education is more attached to parental education 
than to maternal education, with the exception of Austria, where we find the opposite result. 
However, we obtain very interesting evidence that, at given point in time (depending on the 
country) the degree of educational mobility with respect to each parent converges to the same 
level. Even so, the general message is that considering only the intergenerational elasticity with 
respect to the father (common practice in the empirical literature) may distort, to some extent, the 
conclusions about the degree of intergenerational persistence of socio-economic status.  
 
This result may be in part related to the reduction in the gender gap in educational attainment 
in the parents’ generation. However, we also observe a convergence between the degree of 
mobility with respect to fathers and mothers in countries where the mean gap in educational 
                                                 
23 Nevertheless, we must also stress the fact that for Italy and Portugal we find that the temporal patterns of educational mobility 
are roughly stable (especially in Italy at the end of the period).  
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 attainment between the two parents persists (namely, France, the Netherlands, Portugal and 
Spain)24. Therefore, for explaining the convergence of fathers and mothers in the contribution to 
total mobility, we might search for other explanations: an interesting possibility is the changing 
role of the mothers in the family and in the cognitive development of the child, which is also 
related to the increasing participation of women in the labour market. However, note that we 
carried out the analysis neglecting gender differences; that is, we computed the mobility index 
for the overall sample, including both males and females. Perhaps by considering males and 
females in a separate fashion, we would find more evidence on the role of fathers and mothers in 
educational mobility (interesting issue for future research). 
 
Finally, we find substantial effects of family characteristics on the degree of intergenerational 
persistence in educational attainment; however, this effect is not the same for all the countries, 
with lower effects recorded for Nordic countries, France and for the Netherlands. Between the 
components of family characteristics, which exert some effect, we find that the effect of financial 
problems is generally low (perhaps due to the subjective nature of the variable); moreover, the 
effect of the number of siblings on educational mobility also seems to be small. Nevertheless, 
our results suggest that family socio-economic status and parental assortative mating according 
to education have significant effects on educational mobility, which are also likely to remain 
constant over time. 
 
In general, the obtained evidence indicates that understanding the role of family 
characteristics in “mediating” the relationship between parental education and children’s 
schooling is crucial for the analysis of educational mobility. This is because i) parental education 
is statistically associated with other family characteristics and ii) those family characteristics 
operate (even if not in a causal sense) as a determinant of children’s educational attainment. 
Therefore, especially in countries with stratified educational systems, family characteristics 
represent “educational circumstances”, or, more specifically, elements that influence educational 
attainment but are out of the control (or responsibility) of the individuals (children). This means 
that policies aimed at reducing the degree of intergenerational persistence of education, in order 
to achieve equality of opportunity, may also be directed to cutting the link between family 
characteristics and educational attainment. Once again, we believe that the only way of reaching 
a significant increase in educational mobility is through the introduction of a comprehensive 
secondary education system that is compulsory until the age of 18. Indeed, this kind of 
                                                 
24 The results are not showed here, but are available upon request by the authors. 
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 educational policy has been implemented in some European countries and is part of the 
educational policy agendas in many others.   
 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
This paper adds some new evidence to the literature of intergenerational mobility; 
specifically, we explore the degree of educational mobility in 12 European countries and its 
evolution across eight birth cohorts, covering individuals born between 1940 and 1980. 
Exploiting the cross-country comparable information about individual and parental educational 
attainment in the 2005 wave of the EU-SILC, we have tried to fill the gap in comparative studies 
of intergenerational mobility (especially for southern countries). We used a new index of 
intergenerational mobility, which accounts for both absolute and relative changes in educational 
mobility. Moreover, the proposed index enables the consideration of the global degree of 
mobility as the weighted sum of mobility with respect to the parents; additionally, the statistical 
properties of the same index permit the analysis of the role of family characteristics on the 
observed intergenerational persistence of educational attainment. In other words, we treated 
family characteristics as “mediating factors” in the statistical association between parental and 
child’s schooling.  
 
Summarising the results, we show that educational mobility is higher in Nordic countries and 
lower in the Southern countries and that the Continental countries are situated in an intermediate 
position. Furthermore, educational mobility tends to increase in Southern countries and in some 
Continental countries, but it is almost stable in Nordic countries and in France; this is because 
the latter countries exhibit a very high level of mobility from the beginning of the period 
analysed, suggesting that there exists a sort of “ceiling” of intergenerational mobility. We have 
also found that mobility with respect to the father and mobility with respect to the mother 
converge to the same level for almost every country (except Italy and Portugal); this may be in 
part due to the reduction of the gender gap in educational attainment during the parents’ 
generation, but we believe that the most relevant explanations for that convergence are the 
changing role of the mother within the family and the cognitive development of the child. 
Moreover, we expect potentially different results in the case of considering educational 
transmission for males and females.  
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 Finally, we suggest that family characteristics account for a significant part of the observed 
educational persistence, mainly represented by the effect of socio-economic status and parental 
educational assortative mating. The significant correlation between family socio-economic status 
and parental education exacerbates the degree of intergenerational persistence because socio-
economic status matters for the children’s education. Moreover, parents are likely to match 
according to education, and this contributes to reinforce the intergenerational correlation of 
socio-economic status; that is, parental assortative mating acts as a family characteristic, 
mediating the relationship between parental and child’s completed education. Therefore, gender 
differences and a more detailed investigation of the channels through which family 
characteristics affect mobility represent new and interesting topics, which will be the subject of 
future research on intergenerational mobility. 
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APPENDIX 
 
TABLE 1: DEFINITION AND SAMPLE SIZE OF BIRTH COHORTS 
NORDIC COUNTRIES CONTINENTAL COUNTRIES SOUTHERN COUNTRIES BIRTH 
COHORT Denmark Finland Norway Sweden Austria Belgium France Netherlands Greece Italy Portugal Spain 
1940-45 313 816 403 491 504 567 986 543 788 3358 712 2092
1945-50 282 985 421 432 474 648 1193 585 804 3506 688 1987
1950-55 269 879 409 383 491 669 1185 533 889 3181 704 1997
1955-60 396 799 437 355 567 705 1213 558 886 3413 761 2313
1960-65 479 733 434 400 556 730 1298 677 870 3781 754 2455
1965-70 461 621 429 390 533 663 1215 669 915 3582 663 2174
1970-75 380 493 362 374 377 546 1129 511 824 3302 581 2035
1975-80 184 393 209 257 217 390 667 257 604 2032 419 1409
                 
TOTAL 2764 5719 3104 3082 3719 4918 8886 4333 6580 26155 5282 16462
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 2: CONVERSION ISCED LEVELS INTO EQUIVALENT YEARS OF EDUCATION 
COMPLETED EDUCATION―ISCED  ISCED 1 ISCED 2 ISCED 3  ISCED 4 ISCED 5-6
        
NORDIC COUNTRIES       
Denmark 6 9 12 13 15 
Finland 6 9 12 13 16 
Norway 6 9 12 13 16 
Sweden 6 9 12 13 15 
        
CONTINENTAL COUNTRIES       
Austria 4 8 12 13 16.5 
Belgium 6 8 12 13 16.5 
France  5 9 11 12 15.5 
Netherlands 6 9 12 13 15 
        
SOUTHERN COUNTRIES       
Greece 6 9 12 13 16.5 
Italy 5 8 13 14 18 
Portugal 6 9 12 13 16 
Spain 6 8 12 13 17 
  Note: we apply the same conversion for individual applied for parents. 
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TABLE 3: EXPLANATORY VARIABLES OF THE EXTENDED MEASUREMENT MODEL 
VARIABLE DEFINITION MAXIMUM MINIMUM
log(father's years of education) logarithm of imputed years of education (father) 
log(mother's years of education) logarithm of imputed years of education (mother) 
country specifics 
gender  dichotomic: 1 if male 0 1 
number of siblings number of brothers/sisters 
when the individual was 14 
0 21 
father not working 
dichotomic: 1 if the father 
was unemployed or inactive 
when the individual was 14 
0 1 
mother not working 
dichotomic: 1 if the mother 
was unemployed or inactive 
when the individual was 14 
0 1 
intact family 
dichotomic: 1 if the individual 
was living with both parents 
when he/she was 14  
0 1 
highest parental ISEI 
socio-economic status index 
(occupation); highest among 
the two parents  
16 80 
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FIGURE 1a: MOBILITY INDEX ― NORDIC COUNTRIES 
.4
.5
.6
.7
.8
.9
40-45 46-50 51-55 56-60 61-65 66-70 71-75 76-80
BIRTH COHORT
DENMARK
.4
.5
.6
.7
.8
.9
40-45 46-50 51-55 56-60 61-65 66-70 71-75 76-80
BIRTH COHORT
FINLAND
.4
.5
.6
.7
.8
.9
40-45 46-50 51-55 56-60 61-65 66-70 71-75 76-80
BIRTH COHORT
NORWAY
.4
.5
.6
.7
.8
.9
40-45 46-50 51-55 56-60 61-65 66-70 71-75 76-80
BIRTH COHORT
SWEDEN
baseline mobility index mobility respect to the father
mobility respect to the mother 70% confidence interval
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
30
  
 
 
 
FIGURE 1b: MOBILITY INDEX ― CONTINENTAL COUNTRIES 
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FIGURE 1c: MOBILITY INDEX ― SOUTHERN COUNTRIES 
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FIGURE 2a: SIMULATED MOBILITY INDEX ― NORDIC COUNTRIES 
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FIGURE 2b: SIMULATED MOBILITY INDEX ― CONTINENTAL COUNTRIES 
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FIGURE 2c: SIMULATED MOBILITY INDEX ― SOUTHERN COUNTRIES 
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 TABLE 4: BASELINE MOBILITY INDEX AND SIMULATIONS 
  NORDIC COUNTRIES 
DENMARK FINLAND NORWAY SWEDEN BIRTH 
COHORT INDEX  A  B  C  D  E INDEX  A  B  C  D  E INDEX  A  B  C  D  E INDEX  A  B  C  D  E 
1940-45 . . .  . . 0.756 0.917 0.771 0.772 0.832 0.793 0.659 0.786 0.651 0.662 0.715 0.728 0.714 0.795 0.716 . 0.790 . 
1945-50 . . .  . . 0.772 0.895 0.780 0.783 0.824 0.816 0.655 0.787 0.663 0.661 0.722 0.691 0.746 0.821 0.755 . 0.819 . 
1950-55 0.811 0.928 0.815 0.811 0.817 0.915 0.854 0.969 0.863 0.882 0.907 0.873 0.694 0.815 0.689 0.696 0.746 0.762 0.780 0.852 0.783 . 0.849 . 
1955-60 0.732 0.826 0.733 0.733 0.781 0.781 0.801 0.898 0.808 0.825 0.864 0.824 0.690 0.808 0.689 0.691 0.743 0.746 0.735 0.825 0.736 . 0.821 . 
1960-65 0.789 0.898 0.794 0.796 0.813 0.889 0.795 0.872 0.797 0.793 0.820 0.842 0.797 0.889 0.794 0.798 0.825 0.854 0.766 0.849 0.769 . 0.839 . 
1965-70 0.727 0.830 0.724 0.727 0.773 0.795 0.718 0.818 0.715 0.720 0.760 0.772 0.787 0.872 0.789 0.783 0.835 0.830 0.784 0.868 0.789 . 0.860 . 
1970-75 0.681 0.774 0.677 0.683 0.732 0.733 0.823 0.864 0.824 0.822 0.833 0.858 0.809 0.875 0.805 0.807 0.851 0.831 0.743 0.819 0.744 . 0.811 . 
1975-80 0.720 0.834 0.719 0.730 0.758 0.776 0.855 0.965 0.863 0.855 0.954 0.867 0.803 0.892 0.800 0.805 0.831 0.850 0.797 0.875 0.802 . 0.847 . 
  CONTINENTAL COUNTRIES 
AUSTRIA BELGIUM FRANCE NETHERLANDS BIRTH 
COHORT INDEX  A  B  C  D  E INDEX  A  B  C  D  E INDEX  A  B  C  D  E INDEX  A  B  C  D  E 
1940-45 0.720 0.900 0.736 0.733 0.738 0.828 0.655 0.797 0.657 0.658 0.743 0.697 0.780 0.872 0.785 0.783 0.804 0.832 0.646 0.764 0.650 0.654 0.698 0.680 
1945-50 0.670 0.833 0.678 0.682 0.721 0.759 0.554 0.731 0.569 0.557 0.655 0.598 0.780 0.873 0.788 0.786 0.808 0.825 0.645 0.781 0.646 0.652 0.705 0.713 
1950-55 0.674 0.796 0.674 0.678 0.712 0.749 0.692 0.826 0.705 0.703 0.763 0.739 0.802 0.900 0.799 0.829 0.823 0.845 0.669 0.802 0.671 0.683 0.717 0.724 
1955-60 0.750 0.878 0.762 0.765 0.785 0.804 0.638 0.784 0.652 0.642 0.731 0.666 0.805 0.906 0.811 0.823 0.822 0.852 0.671 0.796 0.665 0.675 0.730 0.729 
1960-65 0.752 0.875 0.760 0.761 0.782 0.812 0.656 0.840 0.662 0.663 0.743 0.726 0.780 0.868 0.782 0.803 0.818 0.802 0.696 0.810 0.705 0.696 0.760 0.730 
1965-70 0.771 0.866 0.776 0.789 0.807 0.809 0.694 0.862 0.709 0.693 0.761 0.758 0.738 0.873 0.747 0.769 0.770 0.777 0.759 0.857 0.766 0.760 0.805 0.801 
1970-75 0.752 0.901 0.754 0.772 0.771 0.856 0.744 0.873 0.758 0.747 0.812 0.784 0.777 0.906 0.788 0.806 0.801 0.834 0.759 0.872 0.760 0.760 0.798 0.832 
1975-80 0.767 0.910 0.780 0.781 0.791 0.851 0.717 0.871 0.749 0.730 0.773 0.764 0.824 0.943 0.837 0.835 0.847 0.878 0.693 0.783 0.684 0.690 0.754 0.744 
  SOUTHERN COUNTRIES 
GREECE ITALY PORTUGAL SPAIN BIRTH 
COHORT INDEX  A  B C  D  E INDEX  A  B  C  D  E INDEX  A  B  C  D  E INDEX  A  B  C  D  E 
1940-45 0.604 0.794 . 0.617 0.685 0.662 0.542 0.723 0.559 0.554 0.626 0.589 0.510 0.673 . 0.524 0.584 0.553 0.592 0.770 0.607 0.598 0.669 0.657 
1945-50 0.597 0.775 . 0.614 0.688 0.648 0.600 0.775 0.620 0.616 0.676 0.650 0.551 0.740 . 0.572 0.623 0.618 0.596 0.780 0.611 0.605 0.674 0.668 
1950-55 0.645 0.826 . 0.674 0.725 0.697 0.587 0.759 0.608 0.601 0.669 0.626 0.553 0.729 . 0.572 0.632 0.610 0.611 0.786 0.627 0.625 0.685 0.670 
1955-60 0.643 0.820 . 0.668 0.720 0.704 0.602 0.774 0.621 0.629 0.681 0.638 0.543 0.737 . 0.565 0.627 0.611 0.613 0.813 0.625 0.622 0.692 0.699 
1960-65 0.687 0.848 . 0.715 0.755 0.743 0.641 0.806 0.653 0.669 0.712 0.684 0.605 0.803 . 0.640 0.669 0.690 0.612 0.809 0.619 0.627 0.689 0.698 
1965-70 0.684 0.839 . 0.694 0.763 0.738 0.625 0.801 0.645 0.645 0.703 0.671 0.563 0.773 . 0.600 0.630 0.654 0.649 0.830 0.661 0.663 0.713 0.733 
1970-75 0.719 0.885 . 0.747 0.774 0.789 0.644 0.817 0.661 0.665 0.709 0.706 0.552 0.764 . 0.586 0.617 0.650 0.644 0.815 0.656 0.666 0.718 0.701 
1975-80 0.634 0.819 . 0.677 0.719 0.671 0.662 0.813 0.681 0.671 0.736 0.697 0.589 0.812 . 0.649 0.634 0.680 0.710 0.876 0.733 0.721 0.759 0.787 
 
SIMULATIONS: 
- A ? NO FAMILY CHARACTERISTICS (EDUCATIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES) 
- B ? NO FINANCIAL PROBLEMS 
- C ? NO SIBLINGS 
- D ? NO SOCIO-ECONOMIC STATUS 
- E ? NO EDUCATIONAL ASSORTATIVE MATING 
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